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AI Output:
A Human Condition that Should Not be Protected Now, or
Maybe Ever

XIAO WANG

ABSTRACT
AI is usually considered to be a form of automatic and autonomous
work, but when applied to the creation of literary and artistic works,
challenges arise in deciding whether the AI is the de facto author of its
output and whether AI outputs or AI-generated products should be
protected under the copyright system. This article argues that these outputs
should be human creations because the working principles of AI determine
that AI functions merely as a mathematical tool applied by humans to not
only conceive of but also to execute the creation of AI outputs. The
creativity reflected in these outputs also qualifies them as copyrighted
works. However, this article disagrees with faith-based opinions claiming
that granting protection to AI outputs will be good for the public, and it
adopts an evidenced-based approach to demonstrate that the protection of
these outputs is neither useful nor necessary for achieving the copyright
system’s goal of promoting the public interest and other social benefits.
INTRODUCTION
With the boom in artificial intelligence (AI) technology, the issue of
whether AI can be an author in the sense of copyright law has become a hot
topic among scholars worldwide. Since many national laws and practices
explicitly show that only humans can be authors under the current
copyright system,1 this issue is actually concerned with whether it is
1. See Jane C. Ginsburg, The Concept of Authorship in Comparative Copyright Law, 52
DEPAUL L. REV. 1063, 1092 (2003) (arguing that the concept of author refers to humans rather than
machines by resorting to the legal practices in the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada,
Australia, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands); Ana Ramalho, Will Robots Rule the (Artistic) World?
136
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possible to accept AI authorship by changing current copyright laws. Since
changes mean disruptions to the current copyright law, the question is as
follows: given that the layers of disruption can be divided into minor
doctrinal, major doctrinal, or theoretical,2 how disruptive would AI
authorship be to copyright law?
Several opinions have been provided in the discussion. One considers
AI’s function in its output to be closer to amanuenses than to true
authorship.3 Similarly, another claims that humans retain sufficient control
over what the AI produces and should be considered as the author directly.4
According to these arguments, AI output will not disrupt the copyright law
because it is still a human creation. By contrast, many others hold that we
should consider the AI to be the de facto author of its output.5 However,
even these opinions vary as to the degree of the disruption brought by AI
authorship. One argument is that the AI’s creations are not so different
from human creations because all creativity is inherently algorithmic in

A Proposed Model for the Legal Status of Creations by Artificial Intelligence Systems, 21(1) JOURNAL
LAW 12, 16 (2017) (describing that AI cannot be an author in the United States, the
European Union, and Australia by resorting to more recent cases); Takashi B. Yamamoto, AI Created
Works and Copyright, 48(1) PATENTS & LICENSING 1, 1 (2018) (describing that Japan only protects
works created by humans); Avishek Chakraborty, Authorship of AI Generated Works under the
Copyright Act, 1957: An Analytical Study, 8 NIRMA U. L.J. 37, 38 (2019) (describing that AI cannot be
considered as an author in India because it is unable to discharge legal responsibilities).
2. Margot E. Kaminski, Authorship, Disrupted: AI Authors in Copyright and First Amendment
Law, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 589, 602 (2017).
3. Jane C. Ginsburg & Luke A. Budiardjo, Authors and Machines, 34 BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY
LAW JOURNAL 343, 351 (2019) (“Even the most sophisticated generative machines proceed through
processes designed entirely by the humans who program them”).
4. Samantha Fink Hedrick, I Think, Therefore I Create: Claiming Copyright in the Outputs of
Algorithms, 8 NYU J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 324, 324 (2019).
5. Annemarie Bridy, Coding Creativity: Copyright and the Artificially Intelligent Author, 2012
Stan. Tech. L. Rev. 1, 2 (2012) (describing that computers produce works autonomously and
unpredictably); Russ Pearlman, Recognizing Artificial Intelligence (AI) as Authors and Inventors Under
U.S. Intellectual Property Law, 24(2) RICH. J. L. & TECH. 1, 1 (2018) (arguing that modern AI can
create works independently); Ramalho, supra note 1, at 13 (arguing that AIs are creators of literary and
artistic works rather than a mere tool or aid to human creation); Pamela Samuelson, Allocating
Ownership Rights in Computer-Generated Works, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 1185, 1186-87 (1986) (arguing
that AI programs acts as the “assistants” of humans in the creation of a wide range of products);
Timothy L. Butler, Can a Computer be an Author? Copyright Aspects of Artificial Intelligence, 4
COMMENT L.S. 707, 711-16 (1981-1982) (arguing that AI functions as not only the code generator that
automatically programs but also a simulator of human intelligence); Jean-Marc Deltorn & Franck
Macrez, Authorship in the Age of Machine Learning and Artificial Intelligence, 1 (Centre for
International Intellectual Property Studies (CEIPI) Research Paper No. 2018-10),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3261329 (AIs are “opening the way to unexpected forms of creation. Instead
of depending on a set of man-made rules to produce novel artworks, generative processes can be
automatically learnt from a corpus of training examples”); Kaminski, supra note 2, at 596 (arguing that
AI programs produce outputs that their programmers and users cannot predict); Robert C. Denicola, Ex
Machina: Copyright Protection for Computer-Generated Works, 69 RUTGERS U. L.R. 251, 286 (2016)
(describing that currently, computers create, they write, draw, paint and compose music).
OF INTERNET
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essence.6 With this consideration, AI authorship only brings minor
doctrinal disruption and can be solved by adjusting the work-for-hire
doctrine,7 an approach that has been supported by many scholars.8 More
specifically, it is opined that the US copyright system, which is built on
utilitarian theory or instrumentalism, has reserved considerable room for
nonhuman authorship,9 as utilitarian theory is interpreted as being more
removed from the humanity of its author than the moral rights or naturalrights theories.10 However, different voices argue that utilitarian theory
cannot accept nonhuman authorship because the incentive that this theory
provides to promote social welfare is ultimately enjoyed by humans rather
than by AIs.11 Similarly, another view holds that including nonhuman
authorship in the US copyright system will bring “further uncertainty by
raising more questions than answers”.12 According to these opinions, since
the nonhuman nature of AI authorship essentially conflicts with the human
nature behind the current rationales for copyright law, protecting AI
authorship does not mean minor tweaks for the copyright law but a shift in
its underlying theory. As the introduction above shows, the divergence on
whether AI authorship will disrupt the copyright system originates
fundamentally from a disagreement on whether AI output should be
considered a human or an AI creation. If the AI were the de facto creator of
its output, then it would be meaningful to discuss whether and how to
regulate AI creation under the copyright system. If the human were the de
facto creator of that output, then we would need to determine whether the
human can be the author and whether that output can be a copyrighted
work.
Because the US copyright system is founded on the belief that the
protection of a work is good for the public, Professor Denicola suggests
shifting our emphasis from whether AI authorship is possible under the
copyright system to whether AI output can be protected.13 Following that
logic, if AI-generated output had the same social benefits as copyrighted

6.
7.
8.

Bridy, supra note 5, at 2.
Id. at 27.
See Pearlman, supra note 5, at 35; Bridy, supra note 5, at 26-27; Kaminski, supra note 2, at

615.
9. Arthur R. Miller, Copyright Protection for Computer Programs, Databases, and ComputerGenerated Works: Is Anything New Since CONTU?, 106 HARV. L. REV. 977, 1060-65 (1993) (arguing
that the federal courts and the Constitution do not give confirmative answer that human authorship is
mandatory in the U.S. copyright act).
10. Kaminski, supra note 2, at 599.
11. Ramalho, supra note 1, at 15.
12. Kalin Hristov, Artificial Intelligence and the Copyright Dilemma, 57 IDEA 431, 441 (2017).
13. Denicola, supra note 5, at 270-71.
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works, there would be a strong reason to support the copyright protection
of AI output.14 That raises an enlightening question regarding the copyright
issues of AI output: does AI output have the same social benefits held by
copyrighted works?
Professor Denicola, who considers AI output to be an AI creation,
gives a positive answer to this question by demonstrating that AI output,
especially the creativity reflected in that output, reaches the originality
standard required by the US copyright system.15 However, that argument
has three problems. The first problem is that this answer is still built on the
judgment that AI is the creator of its output, which is an issue that has not
achieved consensus in the current literature. The second problem is that if
the AI is the de facto creator, it is doubtful whether the originality or
creativity standard can be unbundled from human creation and used to
weigh the AI creation. In fact, the originality standards of other major
jurisdictions in the world are built on the premise that the works are human
creations. In the European Union, the standard of originality is described as
the “author’s own intellectual creation”16 which is further interpreted as
involving “creative freedom”,17 “personal touch”,18 or “free and creative
choices”.19 In Japan, the originality standard for works that are less
functional is called “subjective creativity”, which refers to the
“manifestation of author’s personality”.20 In the examples above,
expressions such as ‘personal touch’, ‘author’s independent creation’, and
the author’s ‘personality’ all offer a detailed attribution of human creative
actions that make a work original under the national copyright laws.
Beyond other jurisdictions, although the collective concept of authorship in
the US copyright system, which has bred the work-for-hire doctrine,
facilitates the commercial exploitation of copyrighted works by attributing
authorship to either a fictional entity like a company or a human like the
producer of a film who is not the de facto author but has control of the

14. Id.
15. Id. at 271 (“Since the benefits that writings offer to the public are the ultimate object of the
constitutional clause and implementing legislation, the question becomes whether works generated by
computers provide the same benefits to the public as works produced by human beings. When judged
by the standards of copyrightability applied to human-created works, it is clear that they do”).
16. Infopaq International A/S v. Danske Dagblades Forening, 2009 E.C.R. I-06569.
17. Football Association Premier League Ltd and Others v. QC Leisure and Others and Karen
Murphy v. Media Protection Services Ltd, 2011 E.C.R. I-09083.
18. Eva-Maria Painer v. Standard VerlagsGmbH and others, 2011 E.C.R. I-12533.
19. Football Dataco Ltd and Others v Yahoo! UK Ltd and Others, 2012 E.C.R. 1 (2012).
20. BALANCING COPYRIGHT – A SURVEY OF NATIONAL APPROACHES 571 (Reto M. Hilty &
Sylvie Nérisson eds., 2012).
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product,21 those copyrighted works that are evaluated by the originality
standard—independent creation plus a modicum of creativity22—are still
creations coming from the collaboration of a group of humans. According
to this perspective, currently, the originality standard in the US is still
bundled with human creation. Again, whether that standard can be used to
evaluate AI creations returns to the current discussion on whether AI
authorship can be accepted by the human-oriented copyright system. The
third problem is that even if we admit that AI creation can be evaluated by
the human-natured originality standard, whether AI works reaching that
standard will be good for the public would be a more empirical than
theoretical issue.
Beyond the answer provided by Professor Denicola, we have not seen
other persuasive answers to the question of whether granting protection to
AI output will be good for the public. In the existing literature, we can see
that protection of AI output will maximize the rewards for the AI industry
and strengthen the national economy23, and protection will provide
incentives for future investment in AI.24 Those beliefs are described as selfevident and function as the premise of the discussion on how to allocate the
authorship of AI output. However, when seen from an instrumentalist
perspective, other scholars have reminded us that the protection of AI
output should rely on an analysis of whether the incentive to create and
invest is necessary25 and whether sufficient incentives already exist in
current copyright or patent protection for software or databases.26 That is,
the empirical question of whether protections for AI output will be good for
social welfare should be answered by adopting an evidence-based approach
rather than a faith-based approach.27
To fill the gap in the existing literature, this article addresses two
questions concerning AI output. The first is whether AI output should be
21. Catherine L. Fisk, Authors at Work: The Origins of the Work-for-Hire Doctrine, 15 YALE J.L.
& HUMAN. 1, 4 (2003) (“From the economic perspective, the ability of the firm to obtain property rights
in its employees’ creative products is a significant feature of an efficient intellectual property regime”).
22. E.g., 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §
2.01[B] (2009). See also Benjamin Kaplan, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 45-46 (1967).
23. Samuelson, supra note 5, at 1224-27.
24. Pearlman, supra note 5, at 1 (“Artificial Intelligence (AI) is a booming field, yet the current
United States intellectual property (IP) legal system may serve as a disincentive for future
investments”).
25. Deltorn & Macrez, supra note 5, at 24.
26. Ginsburg & Budiardjo, supra note 3, at 455.
27. William Patry, HOW TO FIX COPYRIGHT 52 (2012) (“there must be mandatory, independentlyproduced, impartial, empirically rigorous impact statements before any new copyright legislation is
passed, as well as impact statements for existing laws so that we know whether existing laws need to be
amended or repealed”).
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considered a human creation. Answering that question can contribute to the
current discussion on AI authorship by not only deepening our
understanding of the working principles of AI but also untangling the myth
of AI creation. In summary, this article will respond to the current
controversy over whether AI and its output have disrupted the current
copyright system in a general sense. The second question is whether AI
output should be protected from the perspective of instrumentalism. More
specifically, we need to explore whether granting protection to AI output
will benefit the public interest by turning to empirical evidence regarding
AI and its output. Part I contextualizes the nature of AI output by
introducing the technologies adopted in producing that output, including AI
technology, machine learning, and deep learning. Based on this background
knowledge, Part II explores the de facto author of AI output, and we find
that the output should be considered a human creation, meaning that the
issue of AI authorship does not exist for the copyright system at all. Given
this conclusion, does this mean we need to grant copyright protection to AI
output? The finding is probably not; Part III gives a social cost-benefit
analysis of the protection of AI output, showing that the cost or the social
risk resulting from granting protection to AI output will outweigh the
benefits. Therefore, this article concludes that although AI output is a
human creation and qualifies as copyrighted work, the time is not ripe to
grant protection to that output. Only when a series of conditions is satisfied
should we consider including AI output in the copyright system.
I. CONTEXTUALIZING AI OUTPUT: AI, MACHINE LEARNING, AND DEEP
LEARNING
To understand where AI output comes from, we need to start by
introducing AI technology. AI technology focuses on the study of
intelligent agents, and four approaches define what the intelligent agent
does: the first approach defines the agent as thinking humanly, the second
as acting humanly, the third as thinking rationally, and the fourth as acting
rationally.28 The fourth approach is considered to be a more practical and
achievable option than the others because rational action can be well
defined from a mathematical perspective.29 This is essentially decided by
the mathematical nature of AI technology.
As a branch of computer science, AI technology is realized by a series
of computer programs following an algorithm. The underlying logic of the
28. Stuart J. Russell & Peter Norvig, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: A MODERN APPROACH viii, 2
(3rd ed. 2016).
29. Id. at 5.
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algorithm is founded on discrete mathematics, which studies discrete
objects consisting of distinct or unconnected elements.30 The discrete
nature can be further explained by the definition of an algorithm, which is
formally defined as “an ordered set of unambiguous, executable steps that
defines a terminating process”31 In this definition, the term “unambiguous”
means “during execution of an algorithm, the information in the state of the
process must be sufficient to determine uniquely and completely the
actions required by each step”.32 According to that definition, an algorithm
executes a step-by-step operation to reach a conclusion,33 and that
conclusion should be presented with finite possibilities to avoid a situation
in which the algorithm never stops.34
The mathematical nature of the algorithm can help us further
understand what AI can do. As a scholar claims, AI does nothing related to
intelligence, but is all about search and optimization.35 The term search
refers to the fact that most AI problems are described in clear mathematical
terms as a search for a solution.36 In other words, what can be realized or
solved by AI should also be mathematically “well-defined problems in
well-defined situations with well-defined parameters”.37 The term
optimization means the AI needs to determine a good solution for the
problem or to select one by comparing the possible solutions, and scientists
enable the AI to do exactly that by using an objective function—a
mathematical description, or equation, of the goal we are using the AI to
search for.38 In that sense, since behaviors such as thinking or acting like a
human are still not completely understood by scientists, it will be harder to
define them in a mathematical way. Thinking rationally belongs to the field
of logic, and it is only one of the possible mechanisms for achieving the
goal of acting rationally.39 Therefore, acting rationally is a more reasonable
goal for AI, and this is defined as follows: for each possible percept
sequence (the complete history of everything the agent has ever perceived),
the agent should select an action that is expected to maximize its
30. See generally Kenneth H. Rosen, DISCRETE MATHEMATICS AND ITS APPLICATIONS xix (8th
ed. 2019).
31. J. Glenn Brookshear, COMPUTER SCIENCE: AN OVERVIEW 189 (11th ed. 2011).
32. Id.
33. Edward Ashford Lee, PLATO AND THE NERD 145 (2017).
34. Id. at 146.
35. Mike Cook, A Basic Lack of Understanding, NOTES FROM BELOW (Mar. 30, 2018),
https://notesfrombelow.org/article/a-basic-lack-of-understanding.
36. Id.
37. Meredith Broussard, ARTIFICIAL UNINTELLIGENCE: HOW COMPUTERS MISUNDERSTAND THE
WORLD 134 (2018).
38. Cook, supra note 35.
39. Russell & Norvig, supra note 28, at 4.
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performance measure (the evaluation of any given sequence of
environment states caused by the sequence of the agent’s behavior), given
the evidence provided by the percept sequence and whatever built-in
knowledge the agent has.40
To reflect rationality, the agent is required to show its capabilities in
learning and autonomy. The agent’s capacity of learning means “a process
of modiﬁcation of each component of the agent to bring the components
into closer agreement with the available feedback information, thereby
improving the overall performance of the agent”.41 The capacity of
autonomy means that the agent does not solely depend on the built-in
knowledge provided by the programmer but can make adjustments to and
even act independently from that knowledge after gaining sufficient
experience of the environment.42 Therefore, AI is also described as an
autonomous machine that can carry out complex tasks without human
intervention.43
AI’s learning and autonomy capabilities are amplified by machine
learning and deep learning technologies. As a branch of AI technology, the
goal of machine learning is to program AI so that it can automatedly detect
meaningful patterns in data and examples.44 To learn to detect patterns and
information, human programmers provide the data and examples to the AI,
and the AI processes the data and draws conclusions that hold for the
environment from which those data and examples are picked;45
programmers then decide whether the AI output reflects the patterns they
want detect. Deep learning is a cutting-edge area of machine learning that
uses multilayered artificial neural networks to improve the accuracy in
learning, extracting, and translating the patterns or features of data without
introducing traditional hand-coded code or rules.46 Deep learning
technology is important because it has enabled the wide use of AI in fields
such as writing poems47 and novels,48 creating paintings,49 and designing
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id. at 34, 37.
Id. at 57.
Id. at 39.
Brookshear, supra note 31, at 462.
Shai Shalev-Shwartz & Shai Ben-David, UNDERSTANDING MACHINE LEARNING: FROM
THEORIES TO ALGORITHMS xv (2014)
45. Id. at 6.
46. Özgür Genç, Notes on Artificial Intelligence, Machine Learning and Deep Learning for
Curious People, TOWARDS DATA SCIENCE (Jan. 26, 2019), https://towardsdatascience.com/notes-onartificial-intelligence-ai-machine-learning-ml-and-deep-learning-dl-for-56e51a2071c2.
47. Geoff Spencer, Much More Than a Chatbot: China’s Xiaoice Mixes AI with Emotions and
Wins
over
Millions
of
Fans,
MICROSOFT
/
FEATURES
(Nov.
1,
2018),
https://news.microsoft.com/apac/features/much-more-than-a-chatbot-chinas-xiaoice-mixes-ai-withemotions-and-wins-over-millions-of-fans/.
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video games50 in recent years. In other words, understanding how deep
learning works will help explain how the AI output is generated.
As the core of deep learning technology, artificial neural networks
(ANNs) simulate the learning mechanism of biological organisms.51 An
ANN has three layers: the input layer, the hidden layer, and the output
layer. The hidden layer consists of many computational units, which are
referred to as neurons, with weighted connections that function as the
intermediate parameters presenting the importance of inputs as seen below
in Figure 1.52

Figure 1: A simple ANN architecture (the feed-forward network)53

48. Michael Schaub, Is the Future Award-Winning Novelist a Writing Robot?, LOS ANGELES
TIMES (Mar. 22, 2016, 10:30 AM), https://www.latimes.com/books/jacketcopy/la-et-jc-novel-computerwriting-japan-20160322-story.html.
49. Ahmed Elgammal, AI Is Blurring the Definition of Artist, AMERICAN SCIENTIST, Jan.-Feb.
2019, at 18.
50. Tommy Thompson, Games by ANGELINA: The AI Game Designer, TOWARDS DATA
SCIENCE (Oct. 20, 2017), https://towardsdatascience.com/angelina-6d4a6a311a4.
51. Charu C. Aggarwal, Neural Networks and Deep Learning 1 (2018).
52. Id., at 2.
53. Jahnavi Mahanta, Introduction to Neural Networks, Advantages and Applications, TOWARDS
DATA SCIENCE (July 10, 2017), https://towardsdatascience.com/introduction-to-neural-networksadvantages-and-applications-96851bd1a207. In fact, the ANN shown by Figure 1 is a feed-forward
network in which the information flows in one direction. A network, which allows the information to
flow in two directions, also exists and is called the error backpropagation network, see generally
Terrence J. Sejnowski, THE DEEP LEARNING REVOLUTION 111 (2018). See also David E. Rumelhart et
al., Learning Representations by Back-Propagating Errors, NATURE, Oct. 1986, at 533–536.
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According to Figure 1, the process through which an ANN is trained
to solve a certain problem can be depicted briefly as below. The training
data are provided to the input layer to be transferred into different values
using the existing algorithms; the neurons will compute those values by
adopting certain equations related to the weights and will pass the output
values to the neurons in the hidden layer. Then the neurons in the hidden
layer will adopt certain equations also related to the weights and obtain the
predicted value for the output layer. The programmer then compares the
difference, which is called the loss, between the predicted value and the
target value and updates the weights so that the loss is minimized.54 When
all weights have been identified to minimize loss, the training of the ANN
is complete, and the predicted value is the AI output presented in
mathematical form. Therefore, in the process of producing the AI output,
the ANN calculates the numerical values to obtain a predicted value by
executing a series of equations and algorithms, and the human
programmers not only provide the training data but also tweak and identify
the weights that result in a predicted value with the minimum loss from the
target value. That is, both AI and human programmers contribute to the
output. This leads to a divergence in the current literature on the issue of
whether the AI or the human should be considered as the de facto author of
the output. This issue is thus a concern for how we interpret the
contributions made by both the AI and the human programmers under the
concept of the author in the sense of a copyright system. Therefore, we will
take a close look at those contributions to determine the de facto author of
the AI output.
II. THE DE FACTO AUTHORS OF AI OUTPUT: HUMANS
Before unfolding the analysis on whether the AI or the human programmer
should be the author of a product, we first need to define the concept of author in
the sense of the copyright system. According to Professor Ginsburg’s summary
built on many national copyright laws and practices, the definition of author can be
summarized as the human who exercises subjective judgment in composing a work
and who controls its execution.55 Refining that definition, two essential conditions
are mentioned in deciding the de facto author of a certain work: one is conception,
which is the action of elaborating a detailed creative plan for a work rather than
envisioning the general ideas, and another is execution, which refers to the action
54. Shiva Verma, Understanding Different Loss Functions for Neural Networks, TOWARDS DATA
SCIENCE (June 20, 2019), https://towardsdatascience.com/understanding-different-loss-functions-forneural-networks-dd1ed0274718.
55. Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 1063-64.
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of converting the plan into concrete form.56 According to this definition, the
question becomes whether the human programmers’ contribution to AI output
satisfies these two conditions.
Many scholars currently answer that question with a negative because the AI
output is automatically and autonomously created by AI and unpredictable to the
programmers and users.57 Those scholars’ impressions of AI output reflect facts
that lead us to refuse to admit the human authorship of AI output. The first fact is
that humans are currently using machine learning and deep learning technologies
to recognize something that is ineffable. As one scholar has claimed, machine
learning technology is a new programming paradigm, a new way of
communicating our human wishes to the computer.58 A common example is how
the human trains the algorithm to recognize a cat in an image. Although humans
can recognize a cat easily, it is very hard for us to tell the AI how we recognize the
cat, especially by programming using instructions understandable by the AI. In that
sense, how to recognize a cat is actually ineffable for humans: something we know
but cannot express through words, let alone to code for computer programs.59 In
the field of painting, AI is also used to express something ineffable for artists. The
Artificial Intelligence Creative Adversarial Network (AICAN) is a newly
developed deep learning algorithm for creating artworks.60 When programing that
algorithm, the artists depicted the AI’s objective function as two opposing goals by
using a mathematical equation: one drives the AI to learn the aesthetics of existing
works of art, but the other aims to avoid presenting a style that is too close to any
established styles.61 In this situation, the human artists cannot exactly describe in
detail the aesthetics reflected in what they have provided to the algorithm, nor can
they describe what the requirement “not too close to any established styles” means
exactly. What they want the AI to do is something ineffable, and they cannot
predict or preconceive what the final output will be. What they have done is
program their abstract and not-so-detailed goals through the algorithm, which leads
us to argue that those artists do not have a detailed plan for what they want the AI
to create. As a result, it seems that the AI creates the output autonomously without
human intervention.

56.
57.
58.

Ginsburg & Budiardjo, supra note 3, at 347.
See generally Bridy, supra note 5, at 2.
Cassie Kozyrkov, The Simplest Explanation of Machine Learning You’ll Ever Read,
HACKERNOON (May 24, 2018), https://hackernoon.com/the-simplest-explanation-of-machine-learningyoull-ever-read-bebc0700047c.
59. Id.
60. Elgammal, supra note 49, at 18.
61. Ahmed Elgammal et al., CAN: Creative Adversarial Networks Generating “Art” by Learning
About Styles and Deviating from Style Norms, in Eighth International Conference on Computational
Creativity (ICCC) (2017), https://arXiv.org/pdf/1706.07068.pdf.
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The second fact is that the patterns recognized by the machine learning
algorithm may also be beyond the human capacity to recognize. This is true
because computers can process a large amount of data and examples that cannot be
processed by humans, and AI under machine learning programs is able to
recognize patterns outside the scope of human perception.62 Taking the case of the
artists who programmed AICAN, to achieve the abovementioned goals, they have
fed the AI with 80,000 images that represent the Western art canon, and they aim
for the AI to learn to avoid limitation to a certain style or genre.63 Obviously,
drawing a painting by analyzing and learning from 80,000 images is beyond the
artists’ capacity and gives us the impression that the artists cannot participate in the
production process; thus it seems that the human does not practically execute the
creation of AI output.
The third fact is that although the human programmers can adjust the weights
of the neurons to affect the final output of the ANN, they cannot explain how the
algorithm comes to its output.64 This reflects the black-box problem of AI. The
application of AI in the medical field can help us further understand this problem.
When using AI for medical diagnoses, it only gives the final answer to a problem,
which means that no one can know exactly and clearly the internal adjustments and
processing that mold that answer. Rather than being guided by built-in medical
knowledge and diagnostic rules, the answer is guided by something that cannot be
recognized by doctors.65 Accordingly, the black-box problem of AI is that humans
are unable to understand how AI makes decisions. Similarly, although human
artists tweak the weights of the neurons so that the AI obtains the desired output
through computation, they do not understand what those numbers mean for the
creation of a painting because the AI is handling something that is ineffable for
them.66 More specifically, they cannot know from the weights why some works
are considered more successful in reflecting the aesthetics preferred by the artists,
and from the predicted value, they cannot know why the AI considers the final
product to be what they want to create.67 In other words, although human artists
can observe how the information flows and is processed inside the AI, they cannot
understand what the flowing and processing mean, and that tends to make us think
that human artists have lost control over the concrete form of AI output and thus
that the AI is creating something that humans cannot predict.
62. Shalev-Shwartz & Ben-David, supra note 44, at 6.
63. Elgammal, supra note 49, at 18.
64. Sejnowski, supra note 53, at 123.
65. Siddhartha Mukherjee, A.I. versus M.D.: What Happens When Diagnosis is Automated?, THE
NEW YORKER (Apr. 3, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/04/03/ai-versus-md.
66. Kozyrkov, supra note 58.
67. Elgammal, supra note 49, at 18 (For example, although the human artists give AI their
definition of creativity, the AI does not always coincide with the general consensus among art historians
when selecting paintings that contain creativity.)
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However, although the facts above are the reality of AI, none of them refute
that the human programmers or artists conceive of and contribute to the execution
of the final output. In essence, the programmers or artists create the AI output by
using mathematics as a tool. How? We need to explain this based on the working
principles of AI. As we discussed earlier, AI is an algorithm built on discrete
mathematics, and the workings of the ANN has further shown us that inside the AI
algorithm there are many equations functioning as computational tools.68 It is
worth noting that in addition to being a tool for computation, those equations also
tell us about the underlying relationship between AI’s inputs and outputs.69 Let us
further explain this by taking the world-famous equation E=mc2 as an example.
This equation tells us about the underlying relationship between energy and mass.
More importantly, it reveals the law and principle of how energy and mass work in
the physical world. Another way to phrase it, the equation E=mc2 decides how the
physical world has turned energy into mass or vice versa. In that sense, AI can also
be interpreted as a more complicated equation that decides how human-provided
work will be turned into output. Therefore, the human who programs AI decides
how the elements in the provided works will be recombined to form the output.
Moreover, by providing the existing works, the human programmers provide the
elements that may be used in the creation of output. By tweaking the weights in the
AI, the human programmers exert a fundamental influence on whether those
elements have been recombined in the desired way, as displayed by Figure 2.

Provided by
humans

Programmed
by humans

Human works as input to
the AI

Affected by
humans

AI
AI Output

Figure 2 The process of producing AI output
With this understanding, we can explain why the humans who not only
provide the works but also essentially decide how the AI works can be the author
in the sense of copyright law. For the product conception, a detailed plan for the
68.
69.

Cook, supra note 35, and Verma, supra note 54.
Verma, supra note 54.

2021

AI OUTPUT

149

work the human wants to create does exist. That plan is reflected in the objective
function of the AI—the goal the programmers want the AI to achieve.70 For
example, the goals in programming the AICAN71 are the plan showing what the
programmers want to create. Since AI describes how the provided works will be
recombined into the AI-generated product, by programming the AI, the
programmers explain in a mathematical way how to create those products. In
addition, by providing the works to the AI, the provider prepares those works as
the raw material for creation, which can be considered to be the plan for what
elements will be used in the final output. For the execution, it is easy to understand
that the action of selecting which works to provide to the AI and the action of
tweaking the weights to obtain the desired outputs from the AI can be considered
to be exercising subjective judgment in composing the work. Addressing doubts
about human control of execution, we can use an analogy to explain why human
programmers have exerted sufficient control over the output of AI. Assume we are
using an electronic pen to draw on the screen of a computer such as an iPad or
Surface. Once the pen touches the screen, it leaves a line with a certain thickness
and color. We can adjust the thickness and color of that line by changing the
parameters of the pen. When we used the pen to draw a painting, no one would
doubt that we have sufficient control over that painting. Why? We have chosen the
lines and decided how those lines will form the final output. It is the same case for
the AI output. The programmers choose the lines they like by providing the
selected works to the AI, and they also decide how those lines will be presented in
the painting by tweaking the weights in the AI.
That analogy can further explain why the inability to recognize the hidden
patterns in the provided works or to explain the computation made by the AI does
not lead to rejection of the idea that humans have sufficient control over the
creation of AI output. When we use an electronic pen to draw, our sufficient
control over the painting does not rely on an understanding of why our touch on
the screen leaves a line of different thicknesses or colors; that is an irrelevant
technical detail. What is relevant is that we know there is a correspondence
between our touch and the line shown on the screen. By relying on that
correspondence, we will have sufficient control over what we want to draw. For
the AI output, both the hidden patterns and the meaning of how the data are
processed are irrelevant technical details. Since the AI functions as the equation
that decides the correspondence between the human-provided works and the
output, by programming and tweaking the AI, human programmers have sufficient
control over that correspondence. In other words, by exerting decisive influence
over how the AI will process the data and obtain the output, the programmers can
70.
71.

Cook, supra note 35.
Elgammal et al., supra note 61.
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control the AI to produce what they want, and it does not matter whether those
programmers understand how the data have been processed or how the output has
been created. This is different from the situation presented in AI’s application to
medical diagnoses. The black-box problem of AI emerges in medical diagnoses
because doctors will not be satisfied by simply obtaining a diagnostic result from
the AI algorithm; they need to know more about how the AI algorithm has found
critical features that may be decisive for detecting a certain disease.72 However,
that is not the case for the literary and artistic works protected by copyright law. In
legal practices, how the work is created is irrelevant because what the courts need
to know is originality verses copying.73 That is, the courts hold a result-oriented
attitude toward protected works, meaning that they think it is unimportant or
impractical to know exactly the creation process for the work.74 The black-box
problem of AI is not persuasive in denying human control over AI output for
another reason: the production process of a work created by a human in a
traditional way without the use of computer or AI is also a black box because it is
also very hard, or even impossible, to define or determine what variables have
decisively influenced the final form of the work.75 In that sense, although humans
cannot understand or explain exactly the internal workings of AI, the fact that they
can essentially affect the final output of AI by providing selected works and
adjusting the parameters that decide how the AI processes these works is enough to
show their sufficient control over the concrete form of the output.
Until now, we have explained why the humans who provide the selected
works and exert decisive influence on how the AI works have satisfied the
conditions of the author under the copyright system. However, there is still an
issue that may prevent us from admitting the AI output as a human creation. That
issue concerns the creativity shown in the AI output—the so-called computational
creativity. In the existing literature, it is considered that computational creativity
originates from AI,76 which implies that AI is the de facto creator of its output. In
essence, computational creativity should be considered a reflection of human
creativity. The most important reason is still that AI, in essence, is a mathematical
tool for humans to create works. Since AI itself has no connection to any human
intelligence at all77 and humans have sufficient control over both the input and
output of the AI, computational creativity has to be something we can find within
72. Mukherjee, supra note 65.
73. Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 1001 (1990).
74. See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946) and Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel.
Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991). According to the two landmark cases above, when deciding
infringement, the courts need to confirm the ownership of copyright and find the existence of copying,
showing that the creation process of the disputed work is of no importance in deciding infringement.
75. Hedrick, supra note 4, at 370.
76. Bridy, supra note 5, at 347.
77. Cook, supra note 35.
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our human creativity.78 There is no difference in nature between the computational
creativity and the human creativity reflected in products. The only difference is the
fact that instead of using pens to write, brushes to paint, and computers to design,
the humans use the mathematics to explore the underlying principles of how the
existing works are constructed and to reconstruct the selected elements into new
works. In fact, when seeing the historically new ideas that emerge from humans’
application of AI in fields such as engine design, pharmaceuticals, and computer
art, we can identify three forms of human creativity: combinational creativity,
which means the combination of unfamiliar ideas; exploratory creativity, which
refers to producing ideas by following stylistic rules that are culturally valued; and
transformational creativity, which is triggered by frustrating the existing rules or
styles.79 Therefore, it is fair to say that computational creativity does not originate
from AI but from the human who uses the mathematical tool in creating works.
Since the AI outputs are human creations and contain creativity having the
same nature as that in other copyrighted works, it is fair to say that these outputs
can be protected under the current copyright system. The author of those products,
according to our previous analysis, can be the human or legal entity that not only
provides the selected works but also essentially decides and affects how the AI
works when recombining the elements of those selected works. However, the story
does not end there because Professor Denicola has provided us with a different
perspective for evaluating whether it is worth protecting the AI output under the
copyright system.80 More specifically, he reminds us to change our emphasis from
the question of whether the AI outputs are, in practical terms, created by humans or
AI to the question of whether the protection of these outputs can bring benefits to
society.81 In other words, although the AI outputs can be protected under the
copyright system, a more important question is whether these outputs should be
protected. For that question, it is necessary to conduct a social benefits analysis of
the copyright protection of AI outputs.

III. SOCIAL BENEFITS ANALYSIS OF THE PROTECTION OF AI OUTPUT:
RISKS OUTWEIGH BENEFITS
As Professor Denicola points out, according to the copyright-patent clause of
the US Constitution, the Supreme Court opinion, and the emphasis of Congress,
the primary goal of copyright protection in the US is to foster the creation of works

78. Margaret A. Boden, AI: ITS NATURE AND FUTURE 68 (2016) (“AI concepts help to explain
human creativity.”)
79. Id. at 68-69.
80. Denicola, supra note 5, at 271.
81. Id.
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for the good of the public rather than for the benefit of the author.82 From that, a
crucial question regarding the copyright protection of AI outputs is whether those
outputs provide the same benefits to the public as other copyrighted works do.83
Professor Denicola gives a positive answer to that question by demonstrating that
those outputs have satisfied the standards of copyrightability under the US
copyright act. Following his logic, if the works were copyrightable or, more
precisely, creative, then they would be considered good for the public. To evaluate
that opinion, we first need to understand what benefits the copyrighted works have
provided to the public and how copyright protection promotes that benefit.
In a general sense, the benefit that copyrighted works have provided to the
public can be summarized as encouraging learning.84 This is reflected in the
establishment of the first modern copyright law. This law, the Statute of Anne,
describes itself as “An act for the encouragement of learning, by vesting the copies
of printed books in the authors or purchasing of such copies, during the times
therein mentioned”,85 and thus the encouragement of learning is a critical target at
the very beginning of copyright legislation. As the direct offspring of that Statute,
the copyright-patent clause in the US Constitution further explains that copyright
legislation should serve the aim of promoting “the progress of science and useful
arts”,86 with the “science” mentioned here being a synonym of “knowledge or
learning”.87 In addition, the US Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that
“the primary public interest lies in increasing and spreading knowledge”.88 On an
international level, a trace of the “encouraging learning” concept can also be found
in the public interest referred to by the WIPO Copyright Treaty.89 In the preamble
of that treaty, some particular fields regarding the public interest are mentioned:
education, research, and access to information,90 which are all closely connected
with the target of encouraging learning.

82.
83.
84.

Id. at 270-71.
Id. at 271.
L. Ray Patterson & Stanley W. Lindberg, THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT: A LAW OF USERS’
RIGHTS 49 (1992).
85. Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Anne, Ch. 19 (Eng.).
86. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
87. Patterson & Lindberg, supra note 84, at 48-49.
88. Ralph S. Brown, Eligibility for Copyright Protection: A Search for Principled Standards, 70
MINN. L. REV. 579, 607 (1985-1986). See also L. Ray Patterson, Eldred v. Reno: An Example of the
Law of Unintended Consequences, 8 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 223, 228 (2001) (“the governing principle of
both the First Amendment and the Copyright Clause is the right of public access to materials that enable
the people to learn, for political purposes in some instances, and for personal education in others”). For
the cases, see United States v. Paramount, 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948), Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal
City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984), and Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151,
156 (1975).
89. WIPO Copyright Treaty, preamble, Dec. 20, 1996, 2186 U.N.T.S. 121; 36 I.L.M. 65 (1997).
90. Id.
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The goal of encouraging learning is promoted by the copyright system in two
ways. The first encourages the emergence of more cultural products that can be
enjoyed by the consumers of copyrighted works.91 As Professor Litman has
pointed out, “copyright was designed to maximize the opportunities for
nonexploitative enjoyment of copyrighted works in order to encourage reading,
listening, watching, and their cousins.”92 In fact, the copyright system trades those
rights for a greater chance of accelerating the creation and dissemination of
cultural products, serving the final target of enriching society’s wealth of culture
and information.93 This idea has been further reflected in the instrumentalism
interpretation of copyright law. Under instrumentalism, copyright is considered an
instrument that provides an incentive for the actions of creating and disseminating
works of social value.94 More specifically, by giving authors a monopoly over
their works, copyright corrects the lack of incentive resulting from free riders’
appropriation of the value created by an author’s effort.95 The instrumental
function of the copyright can also be found from an economic perspective:
copyright should function by not only overcoming the failures of the market
economy to support the production of creative works but also by prohibiting
unauthorized use to promote the correction of market failure and the efficient
production of those works.96 Therefore, by providing incentives for the creation
and dissemination of works, society will embrace the richness of knowledge and
information,97 facilitating learning and benefiting consumers and ordinary people
as a whole.
Another way to promote the public interest is to reserve the space enjoyed by
the user of copyrighted works or a subsequent author building upon them, where
the use of those works will be free from the liability of infringement.98 In addition
to the consumers of copyrighted works mentioned above, the user or subsequent
author of those works are also critical beneficiaries of the copyright system99
because appropriation, given the derivative nature,100 is unavoidable in many
creative activities.101 Inside the copyright system, two mechanisms have been
91. Jessica Litman, Lawful Personal Use, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1871, 1879 (2006-2007).
92. Id.
93. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
94. Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1197, 1197
(1996).
95. Id.
96. Gillian K. Hadfield, The Economics of Copyright: An Historical Perspective, 38 COPYRIGHT
L. SYMP. 1, 5 (1988).
97. Samuelson, supra note 5, at 1224.
98. Patry, supra note 27, at 132.
99. Id.
100. Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1109 (1990).
101. Nicholas Ruiz, Copyright’s Paradox: The Public Interest and Private Monopoly, 18 INTELL.
PROP. L. BULL. 213, 213 (2014).
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established to secure the existence of that space. One is recognition of the
dichotomy of the idea and expression.102 Expression, not idea, is protected by
copyright law, which has become a universal principle worldwide.103 By
excluding the protection of the idea, the building blocks and other raw materials of
our language and culture have been made available for all to use, facilitating the
subsequent creation of works.104 The second mechanism is the limitations and
exceptions of rights. Those limitations and exceptions, which generally include the
categories of works excluded from copyright protection, the free use called fair use
or fair dealing in national practices, and non-voluntary or compulsory licenses,
provide legal reasons for the subsequent creators to use or appropriate the content
of an existing work.105 Take the fair use doctrine stipulated in the US copyright act
as an example. Under that doctrine, when the user of a copyrighted work has
presented the appropriated materials in a way that provides a public benefit and has
not substantially impaired the present or potential economic value of that work,
that user can be exempted from the liability of infringement.106 Therefore, the
limitations and exceptions to the rights mean that a subsequent author or user has
more chances to learn from and add value to existing works, increasing the
knowledge and information that can be enjoyed by society as a whole.
As the analysis above shows, the copyright system promotes public interest
by encouraging learning. That goal is achieved by not only accelerating the
emergence of new cultural products on the market but also by reserving space for
subsequent use that will be free from the liability of infringement. Understanding
that, we can explain why the fact that AI outputs satisfy the copyrightability
standard is not a tenable reason to grant protection: that fact cannot tell us whether
granting protection will be useful and necessary for achieving the goal of
encouraging learning. First, that fact tells us nothing about whether the protection
of AI outputs will support making more cultural products available on the market.
Indeed, the computational creativity reflected by AI outputs makes them qualified
cultural products. However, that does not mean that granting protection will give
the stakeholders of those outputs sufficient motivation to create more works and
bring them into the circulation. Second, that fact cannot tell us whether the
protection of AI outputs will be necessary to provide incentives and reserve space
for the encouragement of learning. In other words, we need to further confirm
whether granting protection will better encourage learning than not granting it. In
102. Paul Goldstein & P. Bernt Hugenholtz, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW, AND
PRACTICE 5 (2013).
103. Id.
104. UNCTAD-ICTSD, RESOURCE BOOK ON TRIPS AND DEVELOPMENT 139-40 (2005).
105. WIPO, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS 15-17 (2nd ed. 2016).
106. Robert A. Gorman et al., COPYRIGHT: CASES AND MATERIALS 949 (9th ed. 2016). See also 17
U.S.C. § 107 (1976).
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fact, to know whether granting protection will be useful and necessary, we need to
rely on empirical evidence concerning the reality of how AI outputs perform on the
market.

A. The Usefulness of Granting Protection to AI Output
We will start by exploring whether granting protection to AI outputs will be
useful in making more cultural products available on the market. The economic
analysis of copyright has told us that both the author and the disseminator of a
work will care about the financial return gained through the actions of creation and
dissemination.107 This idea has been further explained under the context of book
publication as follows: without copyright protection, “the market price of a book
will eventually be bid down to the marginal cost of copying, with the unfortunate
result that the book probably will not be produced in the first place, because the
author and publisher will not be able to recover their costs of creating the
work”.108 Therefore, whether there will be more AI outputs available on the
market is essentially decided by whether the author or disseminator of those
outputs can obtain a financial return from the market. However, the problem is
now that we have not found solid evidence for the existence of a market for AI
outputs from which stakeholders can obtain financial returns.
According to the reports of AI-related industries, AI has greatly affected
economic development worldwide, and it is predicted that AI will contribute up to
$15.7 trillion to the global economy in 2030.109 AI contributes to global GDP by
improving labor production, realizing personalization, saving time, and improving
quality, all of which concern the automation of routine tasks, referring specifically
to manual work.110 That is, AI has contributed to economic development by
improving the efficiency of manual work; it has shown its commercial value for
manual work. However, the reports do not mention the economic contribution
from AI’s application to mental work such as the creation of literary and artistic
works. It is fair to say that AI’s application to mental works has not resulted in the
same financial importance for the economy as its application to manual works,
implying that the commercial value of AI output is negligible. In addition, in the
current investment environment for AI technology, currently, capital is favoring
the following sectors: healthcare, financing, robotics, transportation, retail,

107. Sterk, supra note 94, at 1204.
108. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J.
LEGAL STUD. 325, 328 (1989).
109. Sizing the Prize: What’s the Real Value of AI for Your Business and How Can You
Capitalize?,
P WC
(June
2017),
https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/issues/data-andanalytics/publications/artificial-intelligence-study.html.
110. Id.
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education, security, and manufacturing.111 These sectors have no straightforward
connection with AI’s application to the creation of literary and artistic works,
which means that, at least now, investors are not optimistic about the commercial
value of AI outputs; the implication is that the interest contained in those outputs is
either not attractive to them or is nonexistent. Therefore, the reactions of AI-related
industries and investors to AI-generated cultural products implies that the
commercial value of those products has not yet been confirmed.
Moreover, in recent years, AI outputs have emerged in the fields of poems,
novels, video games, and artworks; we will thus explore more concretely whether
the market for those outputs exists. The first type of AI output is poems. An AI
named XiaoIce was invented by Microsoft to write Chinese poems.112 Although
Microsoft claimed that the poems created by XiaoIce were creative and qualified
for copyright protection,113 its main purpose was not to appeal for the protection of
those poems, but to acquire more data and users by encouraging more people to
use XiaoIce.114 To achieve that goal, Microsoft then claimed that it abandoned the
“copyright” of those poems and welcomed others creating poems by cooperating
with XiaoIce.115 Since XiaoIce is a conversational AI whose main function is to
process natural language,116 collecting more data on how humans create poems
can help XiaoIce to learn more about natural language, helping Microsoft better
compete with Amazon’s Alexa and Apple’s Siri in the AI assistant market.117
Thus, Microsoft’s interest does not originate from the AI-generated poems
themselves but instead originates from the desire to improve the AI’s natural
language processing. Microsoft’s abandonment of the “copyright” of those poems
shows that, in the current stage, the aim of maintaining private interests on those
poems is inferior to the goal of developing AI technology, implying that the
financial return regarding AI-generated products is not the current focus of
stakeholders.
111. Global Artificial Intelligence Industry Whitepaper, DELOITTE (Sept. 27, 2019),
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/cn/Documents/technology-mediatelecommunications/deloitte-cn-tmt-ai-report-en-190927.pdf.
112. Microsoft XiaoIce Releases New Collection of Poems, and How the Poems Written by AI
Taste?,
NETEASE
TECHNOLOGY
(May
19,
2017,
7:13:14
PM),
http://tech.163.com/17/0519/19/CKQQV3G800098GJ5.html.
113. Id.
114. Ran Sun, Interview with Microsoft Li Di: XiaoIce Has Written Poems, and She Can Make the
Copyright Fees as Much as Thousands of Online Writers Make, 36KR (May 17, 2017),
https://36kr.com/p/5075409.
115. Microsoft XiaoIce Announces to Abandon the Copyright of Its Poetry and Open a Joint
Creative Model with Humans, SINA TECHNOLOGY (July 5, 2017, 11:29 AM),
http://tech.sina.com.cn/it/2017-07-05/doc-ifyhrxsk1872320.shtml.
116. Yonghong Xia, Microsoft XiaoIce Writes Poems: Artificial Intelligence Is “Indifferent” to
This
World,
THE
PAPER
(May
24,
2017,
4:27
PM),
https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_1692579.
117. Sun, supra note 114.
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The second type of AI output is video games. For example, an AI named
ANGELINA can create many games in a shorter time than human designers do,
and one commercial target for AI is decreasing the cost of game design.118
However, as admitted by the creator of ANGELINA, this target is still far from
being achieved because the AI was unable to create a game that could be directly
used by a human designer.119 Under its current development level, ANGELINA
can only provide some game concepts or game rules, and these are rarely useful for
human designers.120 Since AI technology is still not mature for designing games,
the creator of ANGELINA currently does not expect to gain any commercial value
from AI output. As this example shows, we can find that for those fields where AI
technology is not mature, it is very hard, and even impossible, for AI outputs to
bring financial returns to their stakeholders.
The third kind of AI output is novels. An AI has been trained to write a novel
that emulates the style of Jack Kerouac, but in that novel, people “might just see
fragments of meaning thrown into a neural network blender, full of hype and fury,
obeying rules in an occasionally striking way, but ultimately signifying
nothing”.121 Different from how people think about human-created novels, why do
people think that the AI-generated novel signifies nothing? The answer lies in the
fact that, ordinary human-created works can evoke a strong sense of experience
among viewers because the creators’ feelings and thoughts expressed in these
works trigger their empathy.122 And empathy is the feeling of understanding
others’ experiences and thoughts from their perspective.123 However, empathy
cannot happen in AI-generated novels or literary works because currently, neither
human programmers nor AI can understand what has been created in those
products. For the human programmers, the black-box problem of AI means that
they cannot explain exactly how the works are created by the AI,124 meaning that
they cannot explain the meaning those products convey. For the AI, the current
technological level is the narrow AI or weak AI stage, which means that AI does
not have self-awareness, emotions and feelings but can only spot correlations in
data and make predictions; thus, AI can achieve a shallow “understanding” that is
118. Simon Parkin, AI Is Dreaming Up New Kinds of Video Games, MIT TECHNOLOGY REVIEW
(Nov. 29, 2017), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/609482/ai-is-dreaming-up-new-kinds-of-videogames/.
119. Andy Meek, This Gaming AI Doesn’t Play Games, It Builds Them Instead, BGR (Jan. 21,
2018, 12:00 PM), https://bgr.com/2018/01/21/angelina-game-ai/.
120. Id.
121. Thomas Hornigold, The First Novel Written by AI Is Here—-and It’s as Weird as You’d
Expect It to Be, SINGULARITYHUB (Oct. 25, 2018), https://singularityhub.com/2018/10/25/ai-wrote-aroad-trip-novel-is-it-a-good-read/.
122. Ingar Brinck, Empathy, Engagement, Entertainment: The Interaction Dynamics of Aesthetic
Experience, 19(2) COGNITIVE PROCESSING 201, 201-02 (2018).
123. Id.
124. Mukherjee, supra note 65.
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far from the human capability of understanding.125 Only after scientists make
technological breakthroughs in realizing artificial general intelligence (AGI) will
we be able to endow AI with capabilities such as self-awareness, humor, love,
empathy, and appreciation for beauty.126 AI scientists’ predict on average that the
date for the emergence of AGI will be 2040, but this has been deemed an
overestimation,127 and it will still be a long time before AI can truly understand
what it has created in its outputs, let alone explain that creation to human
programmers because of the existence of black-box problem.128 Therefore, unlike
the feelings and thoughts conveyed by human-created works, what AI-generated
products convey is unknown to both human programmers and AI. Since no one
knows what AI-generated products are conveying, human viewers’ empathy will
not be evoked by these products. It can be reasonably inferred from this that AIgenerated novels and other literary products will not be lucrative cultural products
on the market, especially when compared with works with which human audiences
can empathize.
The fourth kind of AI output is artworks. When compared with immature
video games and the nonempathetic novel, the AI technology used in creating
artworks is relatively mature because human subjects cannot distinguish AI
artworks from the art generated by contemporary artists and shown at top art
fairs.129 For example, an artwork created by using AI sold at auction for $ 432,500
in New York.130 However, although that may show the existence of commercial
value in that artwork, it cannot prove the existence of a market for AI-generated
artworks. In fact, according to the auction organizer, the auction was a test of
whether the traditional art market is interested in AI art.131 In other words, the
stakeholders in AI art do not consider this auction as having universal significance
in proving the existence of either the commercial value or a market for AI art in a

125. Kai-Fu Lee, AI SUPERPOWERS: CHINA, SILICON VALLEY, AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER 142
(2018).
126. Id.
127. Id., at 143.
128. Mukherjee, supra note 65.
129. Elgammal et al., supra note 61, at 1. I need to further explain that, although there is no
scientific conclusion, I conclude that AI technology applied to the creation of artworks as “relatively
mature” by considering the fact that the AI-generated artworks cannot be distinguished by ordinary
people from the human creations. Here, I use whether the AI-generated works can be distinguished by
ordinary people as a standard because most AI researchers agree with the weak AI hypothesis which
asserts that machine could act as if they were intelligent, and the Turing Test which explores the
intelligence issue of AI by asking whether the machine can pass a behavioral test, i.e., whether human
can tell the AI output comes from a person or a computer. Based on that standard, I conclude that the AI
technology used in creating artworks is relatively mature than its application in other artistic fields. See
Russell & Norvig, supra note 28, at 2, 1020-21.
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general sense. In fact, AI art seems not to be compatible with the traditional art
market. In the traditional art market, social relationships are the core that govern
exchanges among artists, collectors, and dealers.132 To be more specific, dealers
see themselves as patrons whose duty is to “assume responsibility to their artists
and to provide them with support, recognition, and praise”.133 Unlike the
economic relationship that is governed by capital and manifested in the auction,
the social relationships in the traditional art market blurs the boundary between
business and family ties, as they comprise long-term personal relationships
between the dealers and the artists.134 Under that relationship, the dealers’
responsibility is to promote the reputation and status of artists who make good art.
However, this will not be the case for AI-generated artworks. First, it is unknown
whether there will any significance in the existence of a personal relationship
between the dealer and the artist who uses AI as a tool in creating artworks. By
using AI to create artworks, the artist can create more works in a shorter time, and
thus we do not know whether the artist will need the patron relationship. Second,
just as what the auction organizer of AI-generated artwork has told us, we do not
currently know how dealers or galleries will evaluate AI art.135 In their traditional
patron relationship with the artists, they act as the promotors of artists who make
good art, but they may have doubts about considering AI-generated artworks to be
good art or even art because the artists who create them cannot exactly explain
what they have conveyed, even if ordinary people cannot distinguish AI art from
traditional art.136 Therefore, AI art is different from artworks in the traditional art
market built on the patron relationship between dealers and artists. In other words,
although AI art has shown commercial value in an auction, it is still too early to
conclude that AI art will have a market, especially within the traditional art market,
or any commercial value in a general sense.
Examining the reality of all four representative AI-generated products, we
can find that those products have not shown commercial value to their
stakeholders. For poems, stakeholders are focusing more on technological iteration
than on the exploration of commercial value. For video games and novels, AI
technology is not sufficiently mature to help the programmer create something
commercially valuable. For artworks, stakeholders are still exploring whether AI
art will have a chance in the traditional art market.
From the analysis above, the findings concerning AI-generated products can
now be presented. First, the economic contribution made by AI’s application to the
132. Olav Velthuis, TALKING PRICES: SYMBOLIC MEANINGS OF PRICES ON THE MARKET FOR
CONTEMPORARY ART 55 (2005).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Cohn, supra note 132.
136. Elgammal, supra note 49.
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creation of literary and artistic works has not been shown to have any importance
to the economy. Second, investors are not optimistic about the commercial value of
those products. Third, the stakeholders in AI outputs have not confirmed or
practically gained any interest in those products. All the findings above confirm a
reality in which the author or disseminator of AI-generated products will not obtain
financial returns from the market. Under that circumstance, granting protection to
AI outputs will not contribute to achieving the goal of accelerating the emergence
of more AI-generated cultural products on the market.

B. The Necessity of Granting Protection to AI Output
For the sake of public interest, we need to further confirm whether granting
protection to AI outputs will better for encouraging learning than not granting such
protection. The copyright system encourages learning in two ways: one is by
providing an incentive for the creation and dissemination of works, and the other is
by reserving space for the infringement-free use of copyrighted works. Therefore,
incentive and space become two important aspects when judging whether it is
necessary to grant protection to AI-generated products.
Let us first look at the incentive. According to the instrumentalism
interpretation of copyright law, granting protection becomes necessary when the
protection can correct the disincentive resulting from free riders’ appropriation of
the value created by an author’s effort.137 That is, the incentive provided by
copyright protection is practically reflected in the avoidance or correction of free
riders’ appropriation of author-created value. This can be further explained by the
example of the origin and establishment of the Berne Convention. The necessity of
granting copyright protection on the international level originated when the
international piracy of works became a problem. Initially, among European
countries, although literary and artistic works were protected under national laws,
the unauthorized reproduction and use of foreign works were not considered unfair
or immoral.138 However, gradually, a different voice emerged that criticized
international piracy as not only robbing authors’ creativity, labor, and investment
but also depriving them of an incentive for creative activity that enriches a
country.139 At that point, authors’ interests in foreign markets entered the vision of
legislators. To prevent authors’ interests from being damaged by piracy, national
laws started to grant protection to foreign works, and ultimately bilateral
agreements emerged; as the number of bilateral agreements increased, the time
became ripe for the emergence of a multilateral agreement—which is the origin of
137.
138.
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the Berne Convention.140 In the conception of that convention, the organization
that represented the authors’ and artists’ interests—the International Literary and
Artistic Association (ALAI)—played an important role in promoting the
establishment of international copyright relationships.141 Because of their role, the
appeal to protect authors’ and artists’ interests was heard, accepted, and reflected
in the Berne Convention, which defined those interests as crucial values for
copyright protection on the international level.142 From the origin and
establishment of the Berne Convention, we can find that granting copyright
protection becomes necessary under two conditions: one is that the author’s
interest is actually being damaged by free riders, such as the piracy in this case,
and the other is that the authors are actively promoting the protection of their
interest under the copyright system. Those conditions are also reflected in another
example that concerns the protection of performances under the framework of
related rights stipulated in the Rome Convention.143 Although performances
should have qualified as literary and artistic works under the Berne Convention,144
they missed the opportunity because during the drafting of that convention,
performers’ interests in live performances were well protected by contract and
competition laws.145 Nevertheless, after the emergence of technologies allowing
phonograms, films, and broadcastings, the rampant unauthorized recording and
dissemination of live performances hurt the performers’ interests practically and
gravely, which led performers to appeal for legal protection against those freeriding actions.146
Therefore, to avoid creating a disincentive, granting protection becomes
necessary when the interests in a certain kind of work are facing the risk of actual
or possible damage from free riders’ appropriation and the stakeholders in those
works are actively promoting their protection. However, this is not the case for AIgenerated products because free riders’ appropriation of the author’s effort has not
and will not occur. First, currently, the commercial value of AI-generated products
has not been confirmed by their stakeholders, meaning that free riders have little or
no interest in appropriating those products. Second, as we have explained when
140. Id., at 19-20, 42.
141. Id., at 49-53.
142. Id., at 57. (“ALAI text was to form the basis for formal negotiations on a governmental level
for a multilateral copyright agreement.”)
143. International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and
Broadcasting Organizations art. 2, Oct. 26, 1961, 496 U.N.T.S. 43. It is worth noting that, although US
is not a party to that convention and the US copyright act does not formally stipulate the related rights,
the performers’ interests are protected under other statutes like the United States Code. See Daniel
Gervais, Related Rights in United States Law, 2018(6) AMI 245, 246-47.
144. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art. 2, Sept. 9, 1886, 828
U.N.T.S. 221.
145. Ricketson & Ginsburg, supra note 140, at 1209.
146. Id.
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discussing the novels generated by using AI, since many AI-generated products do
not provide a basis for human empathy,147 it is very hard or even impossible for
humans to understand what those products convey. This reduces the probability of
their unauthorized copying or communication. Third, reality has shown us that free
riders’ appropriation does not occur in practice. If we look at the first book written
using AI in 1984, which is called “the first book ever written by a computer”,148
there have been more than 30 years since the emergence of the first AI-generated
product in the literary and artistic domain. However, although during these 30
years, we have heard much news telling us that AI can engage in creative activities
that it was previously incapable of, we have not heard of the existence of any
lawsuit or economic dispute over AI outputs that have been copied or used in any
other human-created works. That is, until now, free riders’ appropriation has either
not yet been identified or does not happen at all. Instead, we find that the interests
that exist in AI outputs are well protected under the current legal framework. A
selection by the programmers of the poems created by using XiaoIce were
published in a collection titled Sunshine Misses Windows and sold online.149
Another example, the allocation of the interest generated from the auction of AI
artwork has not caused any legal disputation. These examples remind us of a
similar situation in which the private interest in live performance was well
protected by contract and competition laws before the advent of new
technologies.150 Since there is currently no evidence that the interests regarding
AI-generated cultural products are facing the risk of damage, it is not necessary to
grant protection to avoid a disincentive for the authors.
For the space reserved for the subsequent use of copyrighted works, granting
protection to AI-generated products may risk its collapse. That risk originates from
the digital universe hypothesis which may represent how AI technology has treated
the world. The digital universe hypothesis postulates that “nature does not and
cannot have a continuous range of possibilities, the total number of possible states
that any system can have (including the entire universe) is finite, and physical
systems are essentially equivalent to software.”151 Its core standpoint is that the
possibilities represented in the physical world are not continuous but discrete, not
infinite but finite. This hypothesis closely connects with AI technology because it
147. Lee, supra notes 127, at 142.
148. Racter, THE POLICEMAN’S BEARD IS HALF-CONSTRUCTED: COMPUTER PROSE AND POETRY
(1984).
149. The collection Sunshine Misses Windows (in Chinese) can be found in
https://www.amazon.com/%E9%98%B3%E5%85%89%E5%A4%B1%E4%BA%86%E7%8E%BB%E
7%92%83%E7%AA%97%E6%9C%80%E6%96%87%E8%89%BA%E7%9A%84%E4%BA%BA%E5%B7%A5%E6%99%BA
%E8%83%BD%E8%AF%97%E4%BA%BA-%E5%B0%8F%E5%86%B0/dp/7559602967.
150. Ricketson & Ginsburg, supra note 140.
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supposes the underlying logic of AI technology. As we have already explained, AI
technology is built on discrete mathematics,152 which determines that the AI
algorithm will process data in a discrete manner—a step by step operation to a
finite conclusion, which is also the depiction of the digital universe hypothesis.
Moreover, that hypothesis supposes that this discrete manner is actually how the
world operates, implying that by using AI technology, humans can learn the
ultimate and general principles of how the world operates. Similar to scholarly
comments, the digital universe hypothesis stipulates that everything that it is
possible to make can be made with software.153
For the literary and artistic domain, the connection between AI technology
and the hypothesis means that human programmers may be on the way to reveal
the general principles of creative activities using mathematical tools. What does
this mean for the copyright system? If this hypothesis is true, it would mean that it
is possible for human programmers to decode the principles of creative activities,
and the expressions resulting from those creative activities will be theoretically
finite. By following those principles, if we ignore the limitations on storage and
computing power, when providing all human creations to the AI, in theory, it
would be possible for the programmers to exhaust all the expressions that can or
cannot be created by humans. Under that circumstance, since the expressions
conveyed by creative activities are finite and can be exhausted quickly and
efficiently by adopting AI technology, they should be considered expressions that
can only be conveyed in limited ways or as building blocks of expressing ideas,
meaning that the boundary between idea and expression is blurred. According to
the merger doctrine, “[w]hen the ‘idea’ and ‘expression’ are thus inseparable,
copying the ‘expression’ will not be barred, since protecting the ‘expression’ in
such circumstances would confer a monopoly of the ‘idea’ upon the copyright
owner free of the conditions and limitations imposed by the patent law”.154
Therefore, those expressions created by using AI technology should not be
protected by copyright law, and granting protection will exacerbate the monopoly
of ideas, resulting in shrinking and even destroying the space reserved for learning.
In spite of the disastrous result of granting protection to AI-generated
products, some may observe that if the digital universe hypothesis is false, then
granting protection would not risk the space reserved for learning and knowledge.
Unfortunately, although the truth of that hypothesis is debated, a consensus has
formed among physicists supporting it.155 Since some physicists have accepted
that hypothesis, we cannot know how that acceptance will affect AI technology
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and its future development, meaning that we cannot rule out the possibility that
granting protection will lead to that disastrous result. Moreover, if the hypothesis
were indeed false, it would not mean that the space reserved by the copyright
system will be safe when we grant protection to AI outputs. As we have explained,
the hypothesis addresses whether human programmers can determine the general
principles of creative activities by using mathematical tools. If the hypothesis is
false, it means that either human programmers will not completely decode the
principles of creative activities forever or that those principles do not exist at all in
a general sense. However, the progress made in AI-generated artworks lead us to
wonder whether that hypothesis may still be valid in certain or limited fields of
creative activities such as painting. More specifically, since AI technology has
enabled programmers to create artworks indistinguishable from human-created
ordinary artworks,156 we are not sure whether there may be some general
principles for creating artworks and whether those programmers are on the way to
reveal those principles. If so, then granting protection to AI-generated artworks
would also lead to the shrinking and destroying of space reserved for the learning
and future creation of paintings. In addition, the progress of AI technology in
producing artworks also reminds us to keep an eye on whether the principles in
creating certain works such as novels and video games will be decoded with the
development of AI technology, although the technology is not yet mature.157
Therefore, regardless of whether the digital universe hypothesis is true or false, its
close connection with AI technology means that granting protection to AI outputs
will risk subsequent negative effects on the space reserved for learning. To avoid
that risk, a reasonable choice is to isolate all AI-generated products outside the
realm of the copyright system until we have a more in-depth understanding and to
maintain constant observation of how AI technology will practically affect the
creation of different works. In other words, when considering the space reserved
by the copyright system, it is not necessary to grant protection to AI outputs and
take this risk.
In addition to considering incentive and space, if we think bigger, jumping
outside the copyright box, we find that granting protection to AI-generated
products may expose society to other risks. The first risk lies in exacerbating the
inequality of social wealth. That inequality originates from the core status of data
in current AI technology. As we have introduced above, the algorithm is essential
to AI technology. To train a successful AI algorithm requires big data, computing
power, and the work of strong-but-not-necessarily elite AI algorithm engineers,
and the quantity of data is decisive for the overall power and accuracy of an
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algorithm.158 This forms a virtuous circle that can strengthen the best products and
companies: more data lead to a better algorithm, which means good products,
which attracts more users, who generate more data that can further improve the
products.159 By taking advantage of AI technology, wealth will naturally be
concentrated in companies that can provide the best products, breeding tycoons in
the AI industry, certain countries, and even worldwide. Therefore, the winner-takeall mechanism caused by AI technology will increase the inequality of social
wealth. Considering that since copyright is a monopoly that burdens both
competitors and the public,160 granting copyright protection to AI outputs, which
is believed to be a way to maximize rewards for the AI industry,161 may instead
exacerbate that inequality inside and outside the AI industry. Inside the AI
industry, it creates an environment for the emergence of new tycoons grasping
monopolistic power over the literary and artistic domains. Outside the AI industry,
it attracts existing tycoons in other fields to expand their monopolistic power over
those domains.
Moreover, granting protection to AI-generated products may become a
catalyst for other social problems, one being the job loss problem. Since AI has
already replaced manual labor in many jobs,162 we do not know whether the
development of AI technology will make it possible for AI programmers to replace
traditional human authors on a large scale, nor do we know whether the protection
of AI output will speed the process of replacement, aggravating the job loss in
society. Another social problem regards discrimination and prejudice. In the fields
where AI applications are mature, such as finance, insurance, education, and
political campaigns, AI algorithms become imprinted with and amplify the
programmers’ prejudices, misunderstandings, and biases, leading to unfairness and
inequality.163 We do not know whether that problem will also occur when AIs are
used in creating cultural products. We do not know whether the protection of AIgenerated products will lead to the emergence of more biased and discriminatory
works, exacerbating the misunderstanding between different groups not only
within a nation but also internationally.
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Just as Professor Breyer had done in making a social cost-benefit analysis of
books,164 in this part, we have tried to make a similar but rougher analysis of AIgenerated products. By granting protection to those products, we expect to provide
incentive for the creation and dissemination of those products and to reserve an
infringement-free space for learning. However, reality ruthlessly frustrates that
expectation. When granting protection, on the one hand, we maximize the rewards
for the stakeholders in those products by turning the uncertain interest or
unconfirmed commercial value into certain legal rights. On the other hand, we risk
society by shrinking and even destroying the space reserved for learning,
exacerbating the problem of unequally distributed social wealth, and aggravating
other social problems such as job loss, discrimination, and bias. In other words, the
cost that society needs to pay seems much greater than the benefits that
stakeholders, the AI industry, and perhaps the national economy can gain.
Therefore, considering the social benefits that may be affected by the protection of
AI outputs, granting copyright protection to them is not a reasonable choice now
and maybe forever.

CONCLUSION
This article demonstrates the seemingly distorted view that although AI
outputs should be considered human creations, we should not protect them under
the copyright system. By examining the technological knowledge of AI, machine
learning, and deep learning, we find that both humans and AI make contributions
to the final output. When evaluating those contributions, we find that the human
programmers or legal entities that not only provide existing works to the AI but
also decisively affect how the AI processes those works deserve to be viewed as
the author in the sense of the copyright system, while the AI merely functions as a
mathematical tool helping the author create AI outputs. The so-called
computational creativity reflected in those products is actually a form of human
creativity. Therefore, our findings confirm that AI output is a human creation
rather than an AI creation, which means that the issue of AI authorship does not
exist at the current technological level, and there is no theoretical disruption to the
copyright system if we grant protection to AI-generated products.
However, those findings only tell us that AI outputs can be protected like any
other human-created works under copyright law; they do not tell us whether these
outputs should be protected, which is a different and empirical question. We try to
answer that question by evaluating whether granting protection to those outputs
will achieve the goal of promoting the public interest or social welfare. The public
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interest promoted by the copyright system is reflected in the encouragement of
learning. More specifically, by granting protection under the copyright system, we
expect to not only provide an incentive for the creation and dissemination of AIgenerated cultural products but also to reserve space for the subsequent and
liability-free use of the products. However, according to the empirical evidence,
we find that commercial value and private interest have not been confirmed by AIrelated industry, investors, and even stakeholders in AI outputs. Therefore, it is not
likely that stakeholders will obtain financial returns by bringing those products into
circulation, which means that they lack the essential motivation to accelerate the
creation and dissemination of AI outputs, and granting copyright protection will
not be useful in providing that motivation. In addition, currently, disincentives do
not exist because no evidence has shown that the existing interests in AI outputs
are facing actual or possible damage from the free-riding actions forbidden by
copyright law, meaning that it is not necessary to provide the incentive by granting
copyright protection. More importantly, considering the close connection between
AI technology and the digital universe hypothesis, granting protection to AI
outputs will risk shrinking and destroying the space reserved for learning and
subsequent use. When not limited to the public interest under the context of the
copyright system, we can also find that granting protection to AI outputs may
result in a series of social problems outside the realm of copyright law. Therefore,
by weighing the possible benefits and expenses in protecting AI outputs, this
article concludes that we should not grant copyright protection at least under the
current technological level, although those products are human creation.
From our findings in this article, we further suggest that only when four
conditions are satisfied should we consider including AI output in the copyright
system. These conditions can be summarized in four questions. The first question
is whether stakeholders have found a mature business model confirming and
exploiting commercial value or private interest in AI outputs. The second question
is whether the confirmed interest in these outputs is facing actual or possible
damage from those actions forbidden by copyright law. The third question is
whether AI technology will turn the expressions of a certain field into limited
expressions or merge the idea with the expression and whether AI technology can
help human programmers or creators exhaust or deplete those limited expressions.
The fourth question relates to whether the protection of AI outputs will negatively
affect other aspects of society. It is worth noting that every time AI technology
develops or makes a breakthrough, such as reaching the stage of AGI, we should
reexamine all four questions above to assure that protection will not undermine our
current copyright system.
More importantly, through this seemingly distorted conclusion, this article
provides an observation that will be considered unfashionable compared with the
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current discussion around AI. Usually, the temper of time is to maximize
intellectual property rewards, especially for high technology innovators,165 and to
emphasize what should be protected more than what should not.166 In the current
discussion around AI, instead of relying on empirical evidence, we are likely to
draw a conclusion from the faith-based demonstration, ignoring or distorting the
reality of how AI-generated products are performed in practice on the market. In
addition to the issues of AI, when confronting any products or works created or
realized by adopting newly emerged technologies, the first question we ask is
always how to protect it under the copyright system rather than whether it is truly
necessary to protect it. We need to keep in mind that since a copyright is in essence
a monopoly167 and empirically leads to a winner-take-all result,168 there is always
a tension between protection and the public interest. To avoid a tragedy in which
the public interest or other social interests are damaged, we should insist on an
evidence-based approach to determine whether it is necessary to grant protection to
a certain kind of work created by adopting newly emerged technologies.
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